Introduction
Everybody has an intuitive notion of the concept of the human will. This is reflected in everyday expressions such as 'where there's a will, there's a way' or 'weak will'. Scientifically, the question of how we can voluntarily control our behaviour has always fascinated researchers from different disciplines such as philosophy and psychology. The question is fundamental to what it means to be human and is closely related to issues of social relevance such as responsibility and self-control. The fascination with willed behaviour is to some degree fuelled by the old philosophical question of whether free will exists or not. But at the same time this controversy paralyzed empirical research on voluntary action and -with a few exceptions -prevented the development of experimental approaches to human volition. Only recently researchers in philosophy, psychology and cognitive neuroscience have come to realize that it might be useful to investigate willed behaviour without trying to solve the question of whether free will exists or not [3, 19, 22] .
In psychology, research on the human will has a long tradition (e.g. [11] ). Nevertheless, will as a psychological concept lost its credibility with the onset of behaviourism and only slowly starts to be rehabilitated under the label of intentional action. Another factor that has hindered empirical research on human will is the deeprooted scepticism of experimental psychology against introspection. However, investigating the intentional side of behaviour seems to necessarily rely on phenomenological aspects of behaviour [24] .
The development of brain imaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) provides a unique chance to overcome this scepticism, since brain imaging makes it possible to relate introspective data to objective measures (e.g. [21] ). The goal of the present article is to give an overview of some recent developments in the domain of cognitive neuroscience of intentional action.
Internally and externally guided behaviour
Philosophical concepts of intentional action distinguish different levels of intentions [22, 24] . Mele [22] , for instance, distinguished distal from proximal intentions. The basic idea is that intentions can be defined on an abstract goal level as well as on a concrete motor level. Hence, philosophical theories of intentional action assume a hierarchical organization of intentionality, with relatively abstract futureguided plans on the one side and very concrete realizations of these plans on the other side. To date cognitive neuroscience research on intentional action has made some progress to reveal the brain circuit involved in proximal intentions. This research is primarily based on contrasting environmentally guided and internally guided behaviour [10, 28] . An example for environmentally guided behaviour would be answering the phone when it rings; whereas picking up the phone in order to call a friend would be an example of internally guided behaviour.
This distinction was mapped onto different parts of the brain by Goldberg [10] already 25 years ago. While internally guided behaviour has been suggested to involve the medial frontal cortex, more specifically the supplementary motor area (SMA), environmentally guided behaviour involves the fronto-lateral cortex. This basic distinction is also supported by clinical neuropsychological findings. In particular, patients with so-called anarchic hand syndrome have problems intentionally controlling the actions of one hand, while the other hand is still under intentional control [1, 8] . Interestingly, the 'anarchic' hand sometimes acts on objects in the environment suggesting that it is under environmental control. Anarchic hand syndrome often results from lesions to the medial frontal cortex, namely the SMA/preSMA and the corpus callosum, supporting the idea that the medial frontal cortex is involved in intentional control of actions while the fronto-lateral cortex is involved in environmental control of actions.
The 'when' and 'what' component of intentional action
Recent brain imaging research has to some degree supported the basic mediallateral distinction and a number of brain regions within the fronto-medial cortex (. Fig. 1 ) have been reported to be involved in intentional action. In particular, the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) and the presupplementary motor area (preS-MA) have been consistently shown to be involved in intentional action paradigms [5] . We have previously argued that these brain regions are related to different components of intentional control of action [5, 13, 23] . In order to distinguish these com-ponents one has to take a closer look at the experimental paradigms that were devised to investigate intentional action.
One of the most influential intentional action paradigms requires participants to decide when to execute a specific action [20] . Participants have to freely choose when to press a key while observing a rotating clock hand. After each trial they indicate the time when they decided to act on the clock. In a recent study Lau and colleagues [19] used this paradigm to investigate the brain correlates of the intentional decision when to act. Participants were instructed to either attend to the intention to act or to motor execution. They found preSMA to be more active for attention to intention compared to attention to action, indicating that the when decision involves the preSMA. Other brain imaging studies used a different approach to investigate the when component of intentional action. They compared conditions in which participants decided when to act with trials in which the time of execution was externally triggered [7] .
The second aspect that has been intensively investigated is the decision as to which action to execute or, in other words, the what component of intentional action.
Paradigms investigating the what aspect require participants to freely decide between different response alternatives [6, 18, 26] . In most of those experiments a free choice condition is compared to a condition where the action is externally triggered. A good example is a recent study by Mueller and colleagues [23] . They compared a condition where participants had to choose between a left and a right key press to produce a stimulus on the left or the right side of the screen with a condition where they responded to lateralized stimuli. In both conditions participants were required to temporally bisect the interval between the stimulus displays. From a perceptual and motor perspective both conditions are identical. From a cognitive perspective, however, they differ substantially. In the intentional action condition participants had to decide on what to do, while in the externally triggered condition they acted in response to the stimulus display. When comparing the intentional action condition with the externally triggered condition increased brain activation was found in the RCZ. Interestingly, no activation difference was found in the preSMA. Based on this simple dissociation of RCZ seemingly involved in processing of what decisions and preSMA seemingly involved in when decisions the authors aimed at testing a double dissociation using fMRI [13] . They designed an experiment where both the when and the what component were independently manipulated. As in their first experiment they could show that the RCZ was sensitive to the what decision. By contrast, a brain region in the posterior frontal cortex close to the preSMA was sensitive to the when decision. This study supports the idea that a when and a what component can be dissociated within the fronto-median wall.
Intentional inhibition of action
Recently, Brass and Haggard [4] proposed a third component as being relevant for the intentional control of action, namely the whether component. In everyday life it is not only crucial to decide when to execute an action and what action to execute but also whether to execute an action at all. In particular, in situations where we tend to respond impulsively, it is crucial to be able to veto our ongoing behaviour to exert self-control. Interestingly, response inhibition has been primarily studied with experimental paradigms where participants receive an external signal that tells them to stop an action [27] . Self-control, however, relies on our ability to intentionally stop an action without getting a signal that tells us to stop, as e.g. resisting the impulse to answer the phone when in a meeting. Brass and Haggard [4] investigated intentional inhibition with an experimental setup based on the Libet task. Participants were required to freely choose when to press a key while observing a rotating clock hand. After each trial they had to report the time when they decided to press the key. However, in addition they were instructed to inhibit the execution of the response in some trials that they were free to choose. When comparing the intentional inhibition condition with the intentional action condition, activation was found in the dorsal fronto-median cortex (dFMC). This brain area is different from brain areas that have been related to stop-signal tasks where an external signal triggers the inhibition process. In agreement with the lateral-medial distinction of motor control proposed by Goldberg [10] the brain areas involved in the inhibition of action seem to follow a similar architecture. External inhibition has frequently been associated with right inferior frontal gyrus on the lateral surface of the brain [2] , whereas intentional inhibition has been associated with the dorsal part of the fronto median cortex. Furthermore, dFMC can also be dissociated from brain areas involved in the when and what component of intentional action. Brass and Haggard [4] interpreted this result as evidence for the existence of an intentional stopping mechanism that can be dissociated from external stopping on a functional-neuroantomical level. In a follow up experiment they fur- ther investigated this intentional stopping mechanism. In this study by Kühn and colleagues [17] , participants were required to prevent a ball rolling down a ramp from crashing by pressing a key. In some trials that they could freely choose participants had to inhibit the response intentionally. When comparing the intentional inhibition condition with the intentional action condition again activation was found in dFMC, supporting the idea that this area is involved in intentional stopping. To summarize, the intentional inhibition of action is related to a brain area that can be dissociated from externally triggered stopping. This suggests that the intentional control of action involves a mechanism that allows vetoing of planned behaviour in the last moment. This veto mechanism might play a crucial role in self-control.
Deciding not to do something
Intentional action can be subdivided into three successive stages: Option generation, option selection and option initiation [12] . Vetoing an action is crucial in situations where a response is already initiated and has to be stopped. In this sense the veto mechanism described above is situated between action initiation and action execution. But every so often we decide against doing something before we have initiated the action we then want to veto. In such cases deciding against a specific option happens on the option selection stage. This raises the question of whether the same functional mechanisms are involved when deciding against a specific action compared to the situation when deciding for a specific action. In other words, how do we represent the choice not to do something. In a series of experiments Simone Kühn and colleagues have investigated this question. First they investigated the hypothesis that choosing not to act is represented in a similar way to choosing to act. One dominant theory of motor control assumes that actions are represented by an anticipation of their sensory feedback [25] . We learn to associate specific consequences to the motor responses that elicited them (action-effect binding). When these associations have been formed, we anticipate these consequences to control our behaviour. The acquisition of such action-effect associations has been experimentally demonstrated by Elsner and Hommel [9] . In a training phase, they asked participants to choose between pressing a left or a right key. Each key-press was followed by a distinct tone. In the test phase participants were asked to freely choose between the different response alternatives after hearing a tone that was previously associated with one or the other response. Participants tended to choose the response that was previously associated with the tone (congruent response) more often than the response that was associated with the other tone (incongruent response). We [15] used the same experimental setup to test whether people can associate an effect with the decision not to do something (nonaction-effect binding, . Fig. 2 ). In the training phase of the experiment participants were required to freely choose between three response options: pressing a left key, pressing a right key and not pressing a key. Each choice was followed by a tone of a specific frequency. After the training phase one of the three tones was played back to participants and they were instructed to freely choose between the three response alternatives (left key-press, right key-press, no key-press). In accordance with Elsner and Hommel [9] participants were more likely to execute the congruent response. Importantly, however, this was also true for the effect tone associated with the nonaction. In other words, participants choose more often not to act after they heard a tone that was previously associated with the decision not to act. Furthermore, Kühn and colleagues [15] could demonstrate that nonaction effect binding only occurs when participants freely choose not to act in the training phase but not when they were instructed not to act. This indicates that the intention not to act is the basis for nonaction-effect bindings. The hypothesis that choosing not to do something is represented in a very similar way as choosing to do something was further supported in an fMRI study [14] and an electroencephalography (EEG) study [16] . The fMRI study showed that the RCZ, which has been associated with the what component of intentional action, is involved in deciding not to do something. This strongly suggests that the de-
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cision not to do something is represented in a very similar way to the decision to do something. This was also supported by the EEG experiment, which showed similar event-related potentials (ERPs) for the decision to do something and the decision not to do something.
To summarize, there is converging evidence that the early decision not to do something is represented in a similar way to the decision to do something, and therefore constitutes a what decision. ed tone in the test phase (consistent = given response was consistent with the association in the acquisition phase; inconsistent = given response was inconsistent with the association in the acquisition phase)
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